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A B S T R A C T
Tantalum, considered one of the critical elements by many countries, is a widely used metal in industries such as
electronics, aerospace and automotive. The tantalum market has experienced several disruptions and subsequent
price swings in the past, implying problems with its supply chain resilience and stability. In this study, we trace
the entire value chain of the tantalum industry from mining to the intermediate and the downstream industries.
Our interest is to see how dependent the tantalum supply chain is on speciﬁc countries and regions, how exposed
primary production is to disruptions, and what mechanism counteracts disruption. This study assesses the
tantalum supply chain from a resilience perspective rather than an investigation of any speciﬁc disruption in the
system. We analyze several resilience-promoting mechanisms such as: (a) diversity of supply, (b) material
substitution, (c) recycling and (d) stockpiling. We evaluate each of these mechanisms, and ﬁnd that even though
diversity of supply and stockpiling mechanisms have been decreasing for years, the tantalum supply chain has
been ﬂexible in its response to disruption. We ﬁnd a much larger supply from unaccounted artisanal and small
mining sources than expected based on oﬃcial statistics, and estimate the unaccounted production in Africa,
which shows an almost 250 percent increase from around 600 tons in 2004 to more than 2000 tons in 2014..
Besides ﬂexible primary production from small-scale mining, we identfy rapid material substitution and in-
creasing availability of waste and scrap as the main reasons behind the observed supply chain resilience.
1. Introduction
Tantalum, considered a critical element by many industrialized
countries, is a widely used metal in industries such as electronics,
aerospace, and automotive. The metal was discovered in 1802, a year
after the discovery of niobium (Nb). Both metals share similar chemical
properties and the ore is commonly referred either as columbite or
tantalite (TIC, 2016a). Relative to any of the “major” metals such as
copper, iron, or nickel, its annual production is minute. However, be-
cause it is produced in countries like The Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and other parts of Africa where mining has ﬁnanced rebel
movements, tantalum is classiﬁed as a conﬂict mineral (Nest, 2011),
along with tin (Sn), gold (Au) and tungsten (W).
Our interest is to see how dependent the tantalum supply chain is on
speciﬁc countries and regions, how exposed primary production is to
disruptions, and what mechanism counteract disruption. This study
assesses the tantalum supply chain from a resilience perspective rather
than an investigation of any speciﬁc disruption in the system. We aimed
to analyze several resilience-promoting mechanisms such as: (a) di-
versity of supply, (b) material substitution, (c) recycling and (d)
stockpiling.
In the past decades, the tantalum market has experienced disrup-
tions and signiﬁcant price swings, which imply problems with its supply
chain resilience and stability. The metal therefore makes an interesting
case study on the resilience of metals supply chains, especially in light
of a previous study on the resilience of the supply chain of rare earth
elements (REEs) that focused on neodymium magnets (Sprecher et al.,
2015, 2017). One of the main ﬁndings of that study was that disrup-
tions caused by export constraints put in place by the main producer of
REEs (China) gave rise to signiﬁcant illegal mining and exports that
eventually contributed up to 40 percent of total world production. The
authors speculated that the relatively novel phenomenon of illegal
mining and smuggling actually helped increase the resilience of the
REEs supply chain (since it allowed for an alternative method of ob-
taining raw materials when oﬃcial production was constrained).
However, because of its inherently opaque nature, they believed it
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would, in all likelihood, have detrimental eﬀects on long term supply
chain resilience.
Illegal mining and smuggling have been an unfortunate ﬁxture of
the tantalum supply chain for decades. Recently, Deetman et al. (2017)
employed substance ﬂow analysis (SFA) to estimate the European
consumption of tantalum and found that the total quantity of tantalum
consumed by Europe alone in a single year is higher than the reported
global production of tantalum. Furthermore, and conﬁrming earlier
ﬁndings of Bleischwitz et al. (2012), global consumption of tantalum
and tantalum-containing products do not match the production statis-
tics of either the USGS (US Geological Survey) or the TIC (Tantalum-
Niobium International Study Center). It seems likely that these agencies
count only primary mine production and government authorized arti-
sanal and small-scale mining (ASM). Thus, the data neglect the large
quantity of tantalum from unauthorized, semi-illegal mining operations
in Africa and associated illegal trade that feeds into the global market.
ASM extraction from soft alluvial deposits and semi-pegmatite ores
is easy to mine and does not require signiﬁcant capital investment.
Informal sources have profound eﬀects on tantalum prices and the
sustainability of the industry, aﬀecting the operations of established
large scale mining (LSM) companies in Australia, Canada, Brazil, and
elsewhere. ASM production at hundreds of sites also responds rapidly to
price ﬂuctuations compared to LSM mining, which require signiﬁcant
capitalization and years to start-up.
The popularity of resilience as a scientiﬁc framework stems from its
application in ecology, where it is used to analyze the ability of a
natural ecosystem to either resist or recover from disruptions (Holling,
1996). This ecology-based deﬁnition of resilience forms the basis of
resilience work in the ﬁelds of information and communication sciences
(Laprie, 2008) and manufacturing supply chain resilience (Zhang and
Van Luttervelt, 2011). As reviewed by Wang et al. (2016), most of the
studies dealing with supply chain resilience have concentrated on the
abrupt disruptions in the supply chains of ﬁrms or products. These types
of studies address ﬁnancial or commercial risks arising from poor
quality or sub-optimal supply chains and follow a qualitative metho-
dology, or use a quantitative simulation-based framework that in-
corporates concepts of resilience into the process of supply chain design
(Craighead et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2007; Sheﬃ and Rice, 2005;
Christopher and Peck, 2004). Many of these studies deal with resilience
either from a perspective of mitigation or response measures.
The concept of a resilient supply chain has also been integrated with
the traditionally used concept of risk assessment of the supply chain of
individual ﬁrms (Peck, 2003). Studies assessing the criticality of mi-
nerals have often used supply risk as a quantiﬁable concept (European
Commission, 2014; US DoE, 2011). Previous academic work has as-
sessed supply risk of various minerals from diﬀerent angles: geological
availability (Machacek and Kalvig, 2016), geo-political availability
(Mancheri et al., 2013; Habib et al., 2016), economic importance
(Mancheri, 2015; Mancheri, 2012; Graedel et al., 2015) and sustain-
ability (Bailey et al., 2017). A common criticism of these concepts is
that they are static in nature. This makes sense for geological avail-
ability, but less so for societal indicators such as geo-political avail-
ability and economic importance. In a review of material criticality
studies, Dewulf et al. (2016) suggested that resilience become a core
component of future material criticality analyses, precisely because
resilience inherently takes a dynamic (i.e., time-dependent) approach.
Tantalum is mined both as a primary product and as a byproduct
from tin, niobium, and lithium extraction. Of the more than 70 iden-
tiﬁed tantalum-containing minerals, tantalite (Fe,Mn)(Ta,Nb)2O6], mi-
crolite [(Na,Ca)Ta2O6 (O,OH,F)], and wodginite [(Ta,Nb,Sn,Mn,Fe)O2]
are of greatest economic signiﬁcance (USGS, 2014a). Tantalum ore is
composed of both tantalum and non-tantalum containing minerals, and
the Ta2O5-equivalent content is typically 0.02–0.04 percent. Low-grade
tantalum ore is physically concentrated (beneﬁciation) to a concentrate
of 20–40 percent Ta2O5-equivalent at the mining site before sale to
smelters (Linnen et al., 2014). Tantalum minerals are priced according
to Ta2O5-equivalent content.
Even though production of tantalum is minute compared to base
metals, its reserves are not. Reserves are deﬁned as the resources that
could be economically extracted or produced. However, the term ‘re-
serves’ does not necessarily signify that extraction facilities are in place
and extraction is economically viable (King, 2011).. The tantalum
content of each deposit is essential in estimating the deposit’s proﬁt-
ability. According to USGS estimates, Brazil and Australia have the
largest reserves, holding more than 85 percent of the global reserves
and other reserves are in Canada and African nations. Estimates of the
most likely resource base by the TIC show that about 40 percent is
situated in South America and about 21 percent in Australia. Tantalum
is also produced in Brazil, Malaysia, and Thailand from “tin slag,” a by-
product of tin smelting. Tantalum raw materials are also being explored
in Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Madagascar, Namibia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Estimated
global reserves of tantalum are large and more than suﬃcient to meet
global demand for the foreseeable future, possibly the next 500 years.
Therefore, geological availability does not appear to be a major concern
for the supply of tantalum.
As of 2017, there are only a handful of countries producing tan-
talum ore but there are very large diﬀerences in production quantities
among these countries. Australia used to be the largest producer, but its
share declined drastically after the main producing mine closed in
2008. Brazil is a major primary mine producer while large quantities
are produced in the DRC, Rwanda, and other African countries by ar-
tisanal miners. Additional quantities are produced intermittently or at
low levels in Australia, Burundi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Thailand, and Zimbabwe (USGS, 2016).
ASM operations greatly contribute to the opaque and even secretive
nature of the tantalum industry. Although recent legislation and
guidelines have pushed buyers to ensure purchased mineral is conﬂict
free, it appears a large share of unaccounted supply still emerges from
Central African countries. The quantity of production does not match
either the tantalum contained in intermediate and ﬁnal products, nor
does it correspond to the resource base and global reserves, as most of
these proven resources are concentrated in well-developed markets
rather than in African countries (Fig. 1). There have been attempts –
both governmental and non-governmental – to prevent trade in conﬂict
minerals including tantalum (Young, 2015; Bleischwitz et al., 2012).
One such major initiative is section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
essentially requires US companies to report to the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and disclose whether the tantalum or
other conﬂict minerals they buy originate in a conﬂict region (SEC,
2011). A similar law was introduced in the EU parliament in June 2016
(EU Parliament, 2016) and expected to be implemented by 2021.
Tantalum concentrate is mainly processed by smelters in in-
dustrialized countries such as China, Japan, Germany, and the USA.
Ta2O5 concentrate is dissolved in acid at high temperatures to extract K-
salt (potassium ﬂuortantalate, potassium ﬂuorotantalate, potassium
heptaﬂuorotantalate, or potassium tantalum ﬂuoride) or puriﬁed into
Ta2O5 (tantalum pentoxide or tantalum oxide). Further processing re-
sults in tantalum metal powder and other tantalum-containing mate-
rials (TIC, 2016a).
Fig. 2 shows the number of major processing companies in diﬀerent
countries. China tops the list with 16 smelting companies. These
numbers may not be completely accurate as during our investigation we
found a number of small scale companies who process tantalum in
China, Korea, Kazakhstan, and the US and they are not listed in the
ﬁgure. A study by Achebe identiﬁed a total of 48 smelting and reﬁning
facilities worldwide, with China hosting 19, the US and Mexico 11 fa-
cilities each, Europe having 8 facilities, and Eurasia, including Japan,
India, Thailand, Kazakhstan, and Russia hosting 8 facilities (Achebe,
2016).
Disruptions in the tantalum supply chain have occurred during the
transportation of the beneﬁciated concentrate from mining countries to
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processing countries caused by incidents such as theft, missing con-
tainers, logistical problems, and unaccounted and conﬂict minerals
entering the global market. For example, tantalite mined in the DRC, is
usually transported across porous borders into neighboring Rwanda or
Uganda before being exported to overseas reﬁners (Moran et al., 2014).
In recent years, Rwanda has become a major apparent producer with a
large percentage of its exports being traced to the DRC (Bleischwitz
et al., 2012; Nest, 2011).
Fig. 2 shows the share of tantalum usage by intermediate sector. The
largest application (41%) is in the capacitor and semiconductor in-
dustry, where it is consumed in the form of tantalum powder. Tantalum
content allows capacitors to be small and dense, making them valuable
for size-constrained, high-performance electronic devices including
laptops and mobile phones (Moran et al., 2014). A further 12% of
Fig. 1. Most likely resource base and reserve estimates of tantalum.
Source: Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center (TIC, 2016a); US Geological Survey (USGS, 2016).
Fig. 2. Tantalum supply chain across upstream and downstream industries. The numbers inside the red circles are the number of major processing companies in diﬀerent countries. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Source: Based on USGS, 2014a,b; USGS, 2016; BGS, 2011; and Deetman et al., 2017.
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tantalum is used in other applications in the electronics sector. Tan-
talum is highly resistant to heat and corrosion and therefore an im-
portant component in a variety of alloys and carbides, which are used in
a range of specialized applications including electronic and medical
devices, prosthetics, optical lenses, aerospace engines, and cutting
tools.
2. Method and data
2.1. Resilience
Supply chains are complex systems with numerous actors and re-
lations (Fig. 3). The development of resilience theory for supply chains
of raw materials oﬀers an eﬀective theoretical framework for studying
how systems responds to disruptions (short term disturbances) and
constraints (long-term disturbances). For the supply chains of raw
materials, resilience is deﬁned as ‘the capacity to supply enough of a
given material to satisfy the demands of society, and to provide suitable
alternatives if insuﬃcient supply is available’. Conceptually, resilience
is dependent on three factors (after Sprecher et al., 2015):
• Resistance: the system maintains its function (i.e., it is able to tol-
erate various types of disturbances without experiencing un-
acceptable loss of function).
• Rapidity: the system is able to rapidly recover so that it meets its
goals again within a short period following the disturbance.
• Flexibility: the system is capable of meeting supply needs under a
disturbance by switching between diﬀerent (alternative) sub-
systems.
More concretely, the factors that contribute to resilience consist of
(a) diversity of supply, (b) material substitution, (c) change of material
properties, and (d) stockpiling.
In this work, we consider the entire tantalum industry (Fig. 4), in-
cluding primary mine production, artisanal and small-scale mining
(ASM), international trade, recycling rate and new investments in pri-
mary mining. We also consider a number of events that periodically
aﬀect the system, such as disruptions in production, changes in
Fig. 3. The tantalum supply chain. Each box represents a stock of tantalum, while the form in which the tantalum is in that part of the supply chain is indicated between brackets. The
arrows between the stocks represent physical ﬂows of material. Green indicates stocks and ﬂows that do not currently happen on a relevant scale (postconsumer recycling). The blue
arrows represent how the elements in the system inﬂuence each other: the arrowheads indicate the direction of the inﬂuence, the S or O next to the arrowhead indicate whether the
connected parameters change in the Same or Opposite direction. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
Fig. 4. The complete set of system dynamics in the tantalum supply chain, as found in this work. Compared to Fig. 3 the resilience mechanisms are added, and there is further elaboration
of relationships between parameters.
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government policies, technological shift and substitution, and price
ﬂuctuations.
2.2. Data collection
There are wide discrepancies in estimated amounts of tantalum
produced, traded and consumed internationally (USGS, 2016; TIC,
2016b; BGS, 2011; Achebe, 2016; Bleischwitz et al., 2012). Our analysis
highlights this mismatch in production and trade with particular at-
tention to African countries. Our analysis is based on the data from
sources including USGS, TIC and UN Comtrade database, and in-
corporates information obtained from companies through personal non-
structured interviews and email communications. We use physical
quantity rather than economic value to discuss tantalum production
and trade to avoid bias associated with monetary valuation and price
volatilities.
Based on the tantalum concentration data presented in Table 1, we
estimated the global ﬂow of total tantalum contained in intermediate
products, waste and scrap, and capacitors. We also made a number of
assumptions to estimate the global tantalum trade, in order to dis-
aggregate data from UN-Comtrade, which groups concentrates of tan-
talum, niobium and vanadium under code 2615.90 in HS classiﬁcation.
We estimate tantalum quantity by deducting the possible niobium
content with a factor of 0.25 for the Central African countries based on
the concentration data of niobium and tantalum provided by the USGS
mineral yearbook. We cross checked and try to match the production
data of these three elements with trade data and make sure that either
niobium or vanadium is not included in the data set inadvertently. We
also considered the reported data of importing countries, which seems a
more accurate approach than using the export data, given that many of
the tantalum producing countries in Africa do not report their export
reliably. We estimate the unaccounted African production by deducting
the quantity of primary mine production (oﬃcially reported) from the
global trade data of tantalum articles, assuming that tantalum articles
are close to 100 percent tantalum (Table 1).
3. Results
The basic resilience framework and diﬀerent mechanisms that un-
derpin rapidity, resistance, and ﬂexibility in tantalum supply chain are
shown in Fig. 4. In following subsections, we discuss the factors that
inﬂuence resilience in the system and how the system recovers from
disruptions.
Fig. 4 shows the dynamics of tantalum supply chain. The price
mechanism acts as an overarching feedback loop. Increased demand
causes an increase in price, while increased supply inﬂuences the price
negatively. Price ﬂuctuations are discussed in Section 3.1. An increase
in price also positively inﬂuences investment in primary mining (Sec-
tion 3.1), diversity of supply (Section 3.2) recycling (Section 3.3), and
substitution (Section 3.4). Stockpiling material can act both stabilizing
and destabilizing (Section 3.5). Finally, the legal framework sur-
rounding tantalum is of particular interest given considerations of
tantalum as a conﬂict mineral (Section 3.6).
3.1. Overarching feedback loop: pricing and price ﬂuctuations
Although reliable data for prices before 2000 are hard to come by,
conﬂicts in Central Africa combined with increasing demand from the
capacitor industry caused the tantalite price to sharply increase,
peaking at US$350/lb in 2000. Eﬀorts by industry to substitute tan-
talum in capacitors (Section 3.4) along with receding conﬂicts in Cen-
tral Africa led to a drastic decline in price in following years. In this
section, we discuss mechanics of tantalum pricing, focusing on the peak
of 2010 and the period leading up to that.
We note that pricing is quite opaque. Unlike many other metals,
tantalum is not openly traded on an exchange. There are two principal
pricing mechanisms: long-term contract prices and spot prices:
• Long-term contracts are where price is are negotiated between buyer
and seller and generally remain conﬁdential. Exchange of this type
is common among the conventional (LSM) miners and established
companies in the downstream industry. Volatility may result in
shorter-term contracts, in particular if the market power of suppliers
is strong.
• Spot prices typically encompass lower prices than the long-term
contracts. Certiﬁed conﬂict-free material comes with an additional
premium. Much of the supply from ASM production in Central
Africa is traded into the spot market, and spot prices are relatively
volatile.
In the decade prior to 2010, prices remained stable and below US
$40/lb, with small ﬂuctuations prior to and after the global ﬁnancial
crisis of 2007–2008. Then, around 2010, a major price peak caused
signiﬁcant disruption in the tantalum supply chain.
Fig. 5 shows the tantalite price over the period 2002–2016. In early
2010, prices rose rapidly as global economic conditions improved and
inventories such as the US Defense Logistics Agency stockpiles became
depleted. Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act became eﬀective on July 21,
2010 and prompted companies to cut their dependence on non-certiﬁed
sources. This increased the perceived supply risk in the industry. By
early 2011, prices were three times higher than the previous year.
Once spot prices started to reach US$110-125/lb and contract prices
were around US$150/lb, the LSM companies GAM and Noventa re-
started production at their Australian mining sites (Stratton and
Henderson, 2012).
Increased supply from ASM in Africa with a moderate demand from
the downstream industry in 2011 caused the average price to decline
from US$110/lb to about US$95/lb by year-end. The price of tantalum
oxide (Fig. 5) also started to decline, from US$500-550/kg in June 2011
to US$270-300/kg in January 2016.
These price declines forced many large mines to close. Fig. 6 gives
an overview of status of major tantalum mines as of 2017. GAM sus-
pended production at its Australian Wodgina mine in January 2012. At
its peak, this mine produced almost 700 tons per annum, about 25–35
percent of the world supply. The Kenticha mine in Ethiopia suspended
its operations in May 2012. The mine had been one of the major pro-
ducers of tantalum, contributing, with an annual production capacity of
275 tons, almost 14 percent of the world supply. Kenticha was closed
Table 1
Concentration of tantalum in various intermediate products and pre-consumer waste and
scrap.
Material Theoretical value Actual value
Tantalum carbide 93.7% 92.9%
Capacitor grade Tantalum powder
– of EBM form 99% 99.6%
– of advanced particle form 96.8% 98%
Tantalum ingot 99.2% 99.8%
Mill product of Tantaluma 99.99% 99.9%
Metallurgical grade Tantalum powder 98.3% 99.4%
Tantalum scrapb
– superior grade 99.0% 99.0% and more
– 1 st class grade 90.0% 90.0% and more
– 2nd class grade 20.0% 89.9%
TaW-2.5 alloy 97.5% 96.9%–97.4%
TaW-10 alloy 89.5% 89%–90%
a Ta mill products can be grouped together they are generally produced from the same
starting material. These products are 100% the density of tantalum, surface area is neg-
ligible so oxygen is very low (less than 50 ppm). All other trace elements are also ex-
tremely low and usually certiﬁed as 99.999% pure.
b If its scrap tantalum capacitors its between 20 and 50% Ta, if its sputtering targets its
60%, if its scrap turnings its greater than 90%. Source: Interview with tantalum inter-
mediate manufacturers.
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both due to declining prices and the high cost of processing by-product
radioactive mineral. Other major shut downs in 2013 were the Tanco
mine in Canada, operated by the Cabot Corporation and the Marropino
mine in Mozambique, owned by Noventa, a British company. Marro-
pino had a maximum capacity of 225 tons per annum. The Tanco mine
faced declining ore grades as it reached the end of its operating life,
after operating for almost 40 years with an annual capacity of 175 tons
and supplying almost 4 percent of the world supply.
A renewed dispute in the DRC in late 2012 caused a short-term
recovery in prices. However, since, 2013, the market has witnessed
declining prices across all minerals, including tantalum. There are
several factors keeping the tantalum prices at low levels. Demand from
the downstream industry is not strong enough to push the price up,
since demand from the electronic industry has leveled. Only moderate
growth is expected from advanced technology end-users such as the
aerospace sector. As a result, owners of tantalum mines have been re-
luctant to increase output or re-open mines.
Interestingly, the closing of LSM facilities at Wodgina, Kenticha,
Tanco and Marropino had no impact on prices since buyers were op-
timistic that additional certiﬁed conﬂict-free supply would be available
from Africa.
Fundamentally, low prices make many mining projects ﬁnancially
less viable. This positive relation between price and new investment is
depicted in our basic resilience framework provided in Fig. 4. Invest-
ments in new and potential tantalum projects across countries have
been suspended or placed on hold in response to the decline in prices
along with the increased supply from artisanal miners in Africa. Most of
the mining companies in the tantalum industry are small players and
declining tantalum prices have further forced companies to suspend
production, sell oﬀ assets, etc., and a number of tantalum mining pro-
jects (see Fig. 6) are on hold as investment has become increasingly
scarce.
Low prices have depressed capital expenditure (capex) in the tan-
talum sector as investment companies take a 5–10 year view while
assessing short-term weakness. Fig. 7 illustrates the strong correlation
between exploration budgets and nonferrous metal prices, which have
been declining since 2011. According to SNL Metals &Mining, the in-
dustry’s total budget for nonferrous metal exploration was US$9.2 bil-
lion in 2015, less than half the level in 2012. Investors are constrained
by risk perceptions of ﬁnancing, and greenﬁeld investment (foreign
investments in new operations) are generally unpopular in the stock
market when prices are low.
Table 2 shows the expense of tantalum mining and processing cost
for large scale producers. LSM projects are often based in areas of the
diﬃcult rock types, making it hard to mine and process compared to
alluvial or soft rock ore types in Central Africa suitable for low-cost
ASM mining.
Comparing the costs in Table 2 to the price of tantalum in Fig. 5
indicates that as of mid-2015, if spot prices are used as reference, most
conventional tantalum mines operate with a negative margin and are
probably compensated by co-production of other metals. There are
several examples of polymetallic mines that co-produce tantalum. The
tin industry produces tantalum from the tin slag by-product of the
smelting of cassiterite concentrates. Other examples include struverite
concentrates (a Ti-Nb-Ta mineral containing 9–12 percent tantalum
oxide being produced in northern Malaysia) (TIC, 2016a), tin-feldspar
Fig. 6. Tantalum projects by mine circa 2017, clas-
siﬁed as development stage or closed/on-hold pro-
jects, ranked by possible mineral production.
Source: Information compiled from company web-
sites and market research ﬁrms.
Fig. 5. Tantalum price ﬂuctuations and major related events. Ta2O5 prices
are generally given in $/lb. In this ﬁgure all prices are converted to $/kg to
aid comparison. Waste and scrap price is the average import price calcu-
lated on a yearly basis of the total global import and value.
Source: Argus-metal pages, 2016.
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(for projects in Southeast Asia and Egypt), niobium (for projects in
Brazil and Canada) and lithium (for Australia). Finally, it should be
noted that outputs from mines in Brazil are usually exported to US and
Europe under long-term contract prices. Thus, their operations are not
aﬀected by price ﬂuctuations until contracts are renegotiated.
3.2. Diversity of supply: primary production of tantalum ores and
concentrates
Analyzing the exposure of primary tantalum supply to disruptions is
complex because of a lack of data on production and trade and the
mismatch between production data and trade data, as well as a general
lack of transparency in minor metal industries. Artisanal mining in
Africa adds further complications. Although ASM can contribute to
primary supply in a legal and formal way (Stratton and Henderson,
2012), artisanal mining from the eastern part of the DRC is the origin of
conﬂict tantalum and signiﬁcant amounts appear not to be accounted in
oﬃcial production statistics. First, we will look at which countries
contribute most to global tantalum supply (3.2.1), then we focus on
2014 as a reference year to explore tantalum ﬂows in more detail
(3.2.2).
3.2.1. Evolving tantalum supply over time
Rwanda and the DRC are currently the leading global producers of
tantalum mineral concentrates. On the basis of USGS primary produc-
tion data and UN Comtrade data on trade in tantalum articles, we
calculated the total production of tantalum, both accounted and un-
accounted (assumed to be illegal African artisanal supply). We found
that in 2014, oﬃcially reported primary production (which takes into
account conventional mines, legal ASM ores in Africa and tin slags) was
around 1200 metric tons (USGS, 2016). The total amount of tantalum
contained in products was closer to 3500 metric tons.
Fig. 7. Estimated global nonferrous exploration
budgets, 1993–2015.
Source: SNL Metals and Mining, 2016.
Table 2
Estimated average operating cost of a hard rock mine. Cost calculated for the primary
mining operation of a hard rock mine and production of tantalum oxide.
Source: based on interviews with mining and processing companies.
Cash costs Cost per Tonne Milled ($/t) (1/
2 lb Ta/ton)




Material Handling 0.70 26
G&A 2.00 6
Total 36.7 312
Fig. 8. Primary production versus unaccounted
African production. Data on production include only
tantalum ores and concentrates.
Source: calculated on the basis of USGS data on
primary production (USGS mineral yearbooks,
2000–2016) and UN Comtrade database on trade in
tantalum articles.
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Results are shown in Fig. 8, which illustrates that before the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis there was a relatively signiﬁcant production of tantalum
outside of Africa, and that Africa’s production of certiﬁed tantalum
shows an increasing trend. On the basis of trade ﬁgures and the analysis
presented here, we ﬁnd that Africa today provides more than 80 per-
cent of the world supply, with a large portion of this production not
considered by either USGS or TIC in their tantalum production statis-
tics. Unaccounted supply from Africa is for a large part suspected of
being conﬂict minerals transferred across borders. In fact, actual un-
accounted production in Africa might be even higher than our esti-
mation, as we did not consider the global trade in tantalum oxide and
pre-consumer waste and scrap along with production intended for do-
mestic consumption, particularly in China (Fig. 11).
3.2.2. Global tantalum ﬂows in 2014
As detailed in the previous section, 80% of global tantalum is
sourced from Africa, where a zone of Neoproterozoic-age tantalum-
mineralized pegmatites cuts through the Mezoproterozoic Kibaraan
belt, which extends through Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC.
Ore is mined both from deeply weathered pegmatites and from sec-
ondary placer deposits derived from the pegmatites (BGS, 2011).
Concentrate from Africa is relatively low-cost given ASM production,
and thus outcompetes conventional mines in Australia and Canada,
many of which closed in the aftermath of the 2009 ﬁnancial crisis. We
note that a small portion of tantalum is still produced in Australia as a
byproduct of lithium mining. Brazil, which has the second largest re-
serves, maintains a steady supply despite the low prices. China, too, has
constantly been increasing its domestic production, increasing to about
60 tons in 2015. The dependence of global tantalum industry on low-
priced African resources aﬀects the resilience of the tantalum supply
chain and leaves supply prone to major disruptions. In the following
section, we focus on 2014 as a reference year to further explore exactly
what global tantalum ﬂows look like across the value chain.
Exploring the data underlying Fig. 9 shows Brazil’s exports of 940
tons, which is comprised of both tantalum and niobium, as more than
90 percent of niobium is mined in Brazil (USGS, 2016). While most of
the niobium is processed within Brazil (Abraham, 2015), there is a
chance that a small portion of concentrate is exported abroad. The US
shows some exports, which we believe to largely comprise of vanadium
ores and concentrates. Surprisingly, Hong Kong is statistically a major
exporter of tantalum concentrate. In this case, the port most likely
functions as a transit point to mainland China.
The reported data for year 2014 shows that Rwanda produced 600
tons, the Congo 200 tons, Nigeria 60 tons, Mozambique 85 tons, and
Burundi 14 tons of tantalum concentrates (Fig. 10). The DRC did not
report the export of any tantalum in 2013 or 2014. However, the import
data of other countries shows 517 tons of tantalum being imported from
DRC. More signiﬁcantly, both the Comtrade export statistics and data
reported by Rwandan press quoting National Bank of Rwanda show that
Rwanda exported 2466 tons of tantalum in 2013 (KT Press, 2014),
which contrasts strongly with its reported production of 600 tons. The
most likely explanation is that a major share of tantalum exported from
countries like Rwanda and Uganda is mined in the Congo by rebel
groups and smuggled across the border (BGS, 2011; Nest, 2011). If we
assume that all “missing” tantalum production stems from unoﬃcial
ASMs in Central Africa, the overview of tantalum sourcing and trading
from African countries would look as presented in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10 shows that a major portion of the unaccounted material goes
to Chinese smelters, which is supported by other analysts (Stratton and
Henderson, 2012). In Fig. 11, we track Chinese exports of tantalum
containing materials. As shown in Fig. 2, China has the largest number
of tantalum processing companies and is a major producer of tantalum-
based intermediate and ﬁnal products. Most material is exported to
other countries in the form of tantalum waste and scrap, tantalum in-
termediate products and tantalum capacitors (Fig. 11).
3.3. Diversity of supply: current status and prospects of recycling
Recycled tantalum contributes almost 30 percent of the total supply.
This share has increased continuously over the years. We diﬀerentiate
between post-consumer and pre-consumer recycling. Post-consumer
recycling increases the diversity of supply because it can complement
primary production and provides an alternative means of obtaining
material (Deetman et al., 2017; Sprecher et al., 2014; Schulze and
Buchert, 2016). Pre-consumer recycling does not count towards im-
proving diversity of supply, because it usually consists of internal re-
cycling loops within industry as a result of ineﬃciencies present in
manufacturing processes (Sprecher et al., 2015).
Despite signiﬁcant potential (Nassar, 2017; Deetman et al., 2017), a
limited amount of tantalum is recycled from end-of-life products. The
tantalum concentration in consumer ﬁnished products is usually tiny,
and subject to pulverization during dismantling processes, along with
high upfront transaction and investment costs for establishing a col-
lection and dismantling system, thus making post-consumer recycling
uneconomical (Bleischwitz et al., 2012).
Tantalum is recycled mostly from pre-consumer scrap generated
during the manufacture of electronic components, cemented tantalum
carbides, and super-alloys. Tantalum scrap generated during the pro-
duction of intermediate products has a high purity and is easy to collect
and re-melt directly, and therefore gets fully recycled.
Pre-consumer recycling plays a special role in the tantalum system.
Well-established methods of pre-consumer recycling and recycled tan-
talum receive the conﬂict-free status. Trade in recycled tantalum is
largely transparent as it is conducted between established smelters and
reﬁners. To comply with conﬂict-free tantalum regulation, the US and
the EU are increasingly trading in recycled tantalum. As mentioned
before, the US has about 11 tantalum reﬁning companies and their
production input is largely intermediate chemical compounds, crude
metal forms, and scrap material. The US and Mexico account for 61
percent of the scrap recycling (Achebe, 2016). In contrast, the main
feed stock to Chinese tantalum smelters is mineral concentrate and
other tantalum primary raw materials (Achebe, 2016).
Fig. 12 shows the increasing quantity of trade in tantalum waste and
scrap. 1200 metric tons were traded in 2014, almost equal to the pri-
mary production of tantalum. To generate this amount of scrap at
steady recycling rates, primary production has to keep pace. Instead,
primary production has dropped with closures of many industrial
mines, corroborating the increase in the unaccounted production in
Africa as found in Section 3.2. This data gap is acknowledged in sta-
tistical ﬁgures provided by TIC in their bulletin 164, January 2016,
(TIC, 2016b).
Fig. 5 shows the trend in average price per kg of recycled tantalum
from 2002 to 2016, which reﬂects the price ﬂuctuations of tantalum
concentrates and overall metal price trends (Fig. 7). As in the case of
primary ore mining and processing, the recycling of a product also re-
lates to its market price and the mixture of materials used in a
Fig. 9. Top 10 exporters of tantalum ores and concentrates (HS.261590) in 2014.
Source: Estimated on the basis of national data reported to UN Comtrade, 2016.
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particular product. Thus, the current market price and the value of
other trace elements in the product determine the economic viability of
recycling (Bailey et al., 2017). Interestingly, comparing prices of tan-
talum concentrate and tantalum scrap prices shows that for most of the
years since 2002, scrap has been priced lower than the tantalite, and
since 2011 this gap has grown wider. For example, in 2014 the average
price for tantalite was around US$180/kg whereas the average price for
tantalum scrap was around US$95/kg.
It is somewhat surprising that high purity industrial scrap is priced
much lower than concentrate (30% Ta2O5). One explanation is that the
concentrate price shown in Fig. 5 is the spot price of tantalum supplied
from conventional primary mines, which contributes less than 50 per-
cent to the total world supply, while the balance is supplied by artisanal
miners in Africa at much lower prices.
In Fig. 12 we provide a forecast of recycled tantalum volumes, based
on a ‘business as usual’ scenario (i.e. average growth rate of the last ﬁve
years, no new discovery of alluvial soft rock deposits outside Central
Africa, no increased conﬂict in Central Africa, and no government in-
terventions through mechanisms such as quotas, taxation, or stock-
piling). This shows that by 2025, there will be more than 1600 metric
tons of tantalum supply from pre-consumer recycling, contributing
more than 50 percent to the global supply.
Increased supply from recycled sources shows ﬂexibility in a re-
silient system and in the case of tantalum, the role of recycling is ex-
pected to increase further. Through this increasing dependency on re-
cycled material, the system is capable of meeting supply needs when
there are disturbances (e.g., certiﬁcation and compliance issues and
reduced primary supply) by switching between diﬀerent (alternative)
subsystems.
3.4. Substitution
Although tantalum capacitors constitute less than 10 percent of the
overall capacitor market, almost 50 percent of the tantalum supply is
used by the capacitor industry, making tantalum prices very sensitive to
the demand from the capacitor industry (Vulcan, 2009). Therefore, we
focus on substitution of tantalum capacitors.
To address cyclical shortage and price spikes of tantalum, the
electronics industry asked capacitor manufacturers for substitutions.
Based on interviews we found that material substitution took on
average one year to implement. This relatively fast substitution rate was
due to the fact that alternative capacitor technologies already exist for
other applications. Smaller tantalum capacitors were substituted by
multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs). Larger tantalum capacitors
were replaced by aluminum capacitors. In low equivalent series re-
sistance (ESR) applications polymer aluminum, and in some cases
niobium capacitors, can be utilized (Nakatani, 2010; Vrana and
Reynolds, 2002).
Receding conﬂicts in Africa and substantial substitution occurring
from late 2001 onwards contributed to a decline in tantalum price. In
response, companies restarted their use of tantalum capacitors, even
though aluminum and ceramic capacitors were found to have superior
performance in certain applications (Gervasi, 2012). This illustrates
how substitution is a two-way street between alternative technologies.
In this case, the industry responded in a rapid way to meet the supply
shortage and consequent price rise by turning to alternate subsystems.
Many alternate technologies have their own limitations and are not
as eﬃcient as tantalum capacitors. For example, the diﬀusion rate of
oxygen from the dielectric to niobium metal is higher compared to
Fig. 10. Tantalum ﬂow from Africa in 2014. Numbers in brackets show the production and trade quantities in metric tons. The ﬁgure reconciles data on production and exports from
African countries by assuming that all missing tantalum production stems from the DRC and rest of Africa. The Sankey diagram depicts ﬂows of tantalum, where the width of each ﬂow
pictured is based on its quantity. We assume about 25 percent of niobium content in the export ﬁgures.
Source: Estimate based on USGS, 2016; USGS, 2014a,b, and UN Comtrade data, 2016.
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tantalum, resulting in DC leakage (DCL) instability. Historically, there
was also a lack of high purity niobium powder to meet the speciﬁca-
tions of capacitor manufacturers (Freeman et al., 2012). In the case of
MLCCs, they lose their capacitance properties after few years.
Fig. 13 shows trade in tantalum capacitors, and displays an inverse
correlation between tantalum capacitor utilization and price. This is
most apparent when the price increased sharply after 2010. Fig. 13 also
reveals the substitution eﬀect of a tantalum price change on increased
trade in alternate technologies, MLCCs and aluminum capacitors. De-
mand for ceramic and aluminum capacitors has steadily increased,
except in a few speciﬁc years such as during the global ﬁnancial crisis.
The trade quantity of MLCCs is on average ﬁve times higher and the
average for aluminum capacitors is 10 times higher than the global
trade of tantalum capacitors.
We note that trade comparisons based on weights of diﬀerent types
of capacitors should be seen as indicative, as we recognize the limita-
tion of this comparative analysis. Capacitors range from cupboard sized
to micro components for integrated circuit boards. The type of material
used impact the charge held per surface area of the material, thereby
aﬀecting the weights as well. Capacitors are also used in power elec-
tronics, for instance, as a start capacitor in an electronic motor, and
speciﬁc types of capacitors are used for larger applications.
3.5. Stockpiling: strategic and company level
As illustrated in Fig. 4, building up a signiﬁcant stockpile can cause
a surge in demand, and hence increase price. Release of an existing
stockpile creates supply and consequently negatively inﬂuences price.
Fig. 11. China’s import of tantalum concentrate and export of tantalum intermediate products and tantalum capacitors (in metric tons).
Source: Estimate based on UN Comtrade data, 2016.
Fig. 12. Trade in tantalum waste and scrap, and
projected quantity of trade in tantalum waste and
scrap for 2020 and 2025 in a business as usual sce-
nario.
Source: Estimate based on UNCOMTRADE data,
2016.
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In the case of rare earth elements, Sprecher et al. (2015) observed that
urgent stockpiling during a supply crisis can drive up the price sig-
niﬁcantly, fueling the perceived threat of supply disruption. This leads
to a positive feedback loop associated with emergency stockpiling by
manufacturers and speculators.
Inventories of tantalum held by companies throughout the supply
chain are a signiﬁcant factor in determining tantalum prices and the
demand for primary tantalum. In order to negate the impact of any
temporary supply disruption, the major tantalum intermediate produ-
cers (e.g., Cabot and HC Starck) follow a policy of stockpiling tantalum.
It is estimated that some industry inventories are suﬃcient to last for
two years (Stratton and Henderson, 2012). This is in line with ﬁndings
from Sprecher et al. (2017) for REE stockpiles held by producers of
intermediate neodymium-magnet products.
Perceived supply shortages in the 1990s prompted the US govern-
ment to stockpile tantalum. At its peak, the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) stored around 1200 tons of tantalum, which was greater than the
global supply at that time (Fig. 14). While we could not ﬁnd hard data,
due to the signiﬁcance of the stockpile build-up one may assume that
this contributed to driving up the prices. When the situation normalized
several years later, DLA started to release its stocks. In that period, the
US government was the second largest seller of tantalum (at 175–300
tons per year). The DLA exhausted its stocks of tantalum metal ingots in
2005, metal powder and metal oxide in 2006, and minerals in 2007.
However, the DLA does still hold a few tons of tantalum carbide powder
and tantalum metal scrap in its inventory (USGS, 2014a,b).
3.6. Legal framework
Processors, smelters, and producers of tantalum intermediate pro-
ducts are encouraged to follow OECD due diligence guidelines and the
United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
related to conﬂict minerals (OECD, 2013; UN, 2011). If operating in the
USA, they are also obliged by law to report on sources of conﬂict mi-
nerals, and prefer not to purchase from uncertiﬁed supply-chains. Apart
from governmental initiatives in US and EU, there are also several
programs run by industry with the help of international NGOs and local
governments in Central Africa. These initiatives are referred to as “bag
and tag,” which essentially means identifying tantalum ore at the
source of its production and providing a means to track it along the
supply chain to the smelter (Young, 2015; Stratton and Henderson,
2012). The objective of these initiatives is to provide assurance of
conﬂict-free sourcing of minerals (including tantalum) contained in the
ﬁnal products, based on a chain-of-custody to their original source, and
thus to prevent illegitimate minerals being used (Young and Dias,
2011).
Among the major tantalum-related initiatives are the iTSCi and the
conﬂict-free smelter program (CFSP) developed and driven by the
Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and the Global e-
Sustainability Initiative (GeSI), and recently shifted to the Responsible
Minerals Initiative. These programs have their own limitations, as there
are inherent risks in supply-chains, such as legitimate tags being sold to
illegal producers or theft of mineral, enabling continued markets for
conﬂict tantalum. Notably, neither CFSP nor iTSCi have a system of
collecting and maintaining the statistics on quantities of certiﬁed mi-
nerals, even though most of the tantalum consuming industries and a
growing number of tantalum smelters and traders are part of these in-
itiatives. China, the main consumer of African minerals and the largest
producer of tantalum based intermediate products, has shown less in-
terest in these initiatives in the past. However, as of 2016, the CFSP
claims that all Chinese smelters except one have obtained EICC-GeSI
conﬂict-free smelter certiﬁcation.
Fig. 13. Global trade in tantalum, multilayer ceramic, and aluminum ca-
pacitors.
Source: estimated on the basis of the UN Comtrade data using a unit
conversion factor to calculate the total weight as the Comtrade database
provides trade quantity in kg weight for certain countries and number of
items (units) for others.
Fig. 14. US tantalum stockpile inventory and re-
leases.
Source: USGS mineral commodity (tantalum) sum-
maries 1995–2012.
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Based on interviews with representatives of the industry, we found
that conﬂict-free Ta concentrates generate a price premium at the
smelter level. Conversely, the prices in China for K-salt (K2TaF7) and
tantalum pentoxide (Ta2O5) or intermediate products, like tantalum
carbide, metal, and ingot are much lower than in other countries, im-
plying inadequacy of these frameworks to cover China. However, we
are unable to provide any information as a reference or baseline for
comparing contract or spot prices among the following:
(1) certiﬁed Ta concentrate shipments from Central/East Africa (ac-
cording to the CFSP/iTSCi schemes);
(2) non-certiﬁed (non- CFSP/iTSCi) shipments from Central/East
Africa;
(3) shipments from outside Central/East Africa (countries not covered
under the Dodd-Frank regulations, hence with no regulatory due
diligence reporting requirements).
There are price diﬀerentials among these diﬀerent shipments/
supply chains. Based on current data it is not possible to conclude
whether these diﬀerences reﬂect an actual price premium being paid
for shipments from any of these categories, or whether they eﬀectively
correspond to a price penalty for non-certiﬁed materials.
Additional measures to ensure conﬂict-free material may result in a
supply shortage of major compliant sources of conﬂict-free tantalum
with corresponding price increases. This happened in 2010, when the
introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act prompted companies to cut their
dependence on non-certiﬁed minerals, and the price increased based on
a perceived supply risk in the industry.
4. Discussion on the relevance for market actors and policy
dimension
There are very few studies that have dealt with the tantalum supply
chain in its entirety. This study ﬁlls this gap keeping the price at the
center as an overarching feedback loop and its relations to various re-
silience promoting mechanisms such as diversity of supply, recycling,
stockpiling and legal frameworks. In the process, we quantiﬁed the
unaccounted tantalum supply from ASM sources and its impact on the
resilience. Applying resilience to the entire supply chain is considered
as a dynamic (i.e. time-dependent) approach and we consider this as a
strength of the paper.
We ﬁnd that, while participation in conﬂict-free sourcing has
reached substantial levels, unaccounted tantalum ﬂows are still sig-
niﬁcant. The Dodd-Frank Act and other voluntary requirements had
only a short-term impact on pricing. Similarly, we do not expect the
European enactment of legislation to have any considerable long-term
impact. However, such legislation may bring more transparency to the
industry, strengthening system resilience and helping ASMs in Africa
integrate into the mainstream supply chain. Over the long term,
strengthening the capacity for conﬂict-free tantalum in the market will
likely push prices upward. Conﬂict-free tantalum sells at a signiﬁcant
premium, and is often sold via long-term contracts, which presents the
possibility of large scale mines to re-open.
As shown in the analysis, the unaccounted production and illegal
smuggling across borders in Africa and the primary production in
conventional mines and investment in new projects are intertwined and
dependent on each other. Oversupply from Africa, where labor is
exploited without consideration for human rights or environmental
concerns, makes African resources cheap in the short term and sup-
presses prices below what is considered sustainable (Frankel, 2016;
Amnesty International, 2016). This necessitates strengthening the best
mining practices in Africa and strengthening the certiﬁcation system
without aﬀecting the livelihood of the thousands of people involved in
artisanal mining in Central Africa. The development of a robust and
modernized mining industry in Africa would reduce the price gap be-
tween the African materials and the rest of the world.
Although tantalum ores are currently widely available, the industry
needs to foresee possible supply disruptions in Central Africa. A supply
chain disruption would have a substantial impact on price. The ability
of the market to adjust to this will depend on the time lag needed to
restart suspended mining or to increase production at operational
mines. The US strategic stockpile has depleted its tantalum stockpiles,
and thus is not in a position to stabilize the market in case of disruption.
Like other minerals such as rare earth elements, China dominates in
capability to process tantalum concentrates. There are few facilities
outside China with the same capacity to produce various products
across the full value chain, from processing the ore to making the ﬁnal
products (Mancheri and Marukawa, 2016). Reﬁning and downstream
industries based in industrialized countries, which largely depend on
China for tantalum scrap and intermediate products, should take note of
Chinese protectionism related to material exports (Mancheri, 2015;
Tucker, 2014). In anticipation of such restrictions, the US and the EU
initiated a ﬁrst step in the WTO (World Trade Organization) dispute
settlement proceedings against China in July 2016 over export re-
strictions on select raw materials such as antimony, cobalt, and tan-
talum (Dendrinou, 2016; ICTSD, 2016). This case is the third example
of such legal action taken against China in the last ﬁve years initiated
by the US and the EU.
The current industry practices are not sustainable in the long term.
A practical implication of our work is that diversity of material supply is
important; over dependence on unregulated Central African resources
will keep prices below a sustainably proﬁtable level, negatively af-
fecting the primary mine operations and new investment in formally
regulated and certiﬁed producers.
It is our hope that a resilience based supply chain assessment of a
conﬂict mineral sheds light on ambiguous practices in the industry.
Greater system transparency is necessary to improve sustainability of
the industry and this needs to include a rigorous revision of how data
are reported, particularly at the upstream production stage. A limitation
of this study is that due to the lack of oﬃcial data we relied upon im-
plied data. We were also unable to diﬀerentiate between certiﬁed and
non-certiﬁed tantalum prices. For future research, a detailed analysis of
tantalum ﬂows at a global level, particularly using SFA methods, can
provide knowledge about global ﬂows related to production and sour-
cing practices, while also helping to fully quantify the resilient supply
chain framework parameters.
5. Conclusion
This study highlights the huge data gap that exists between ac-
counted production and the ﬁnal consumption of tantalum. Our results
reveal that Africa today provides more than 80 percent of primary
world tantalum supply. We estimated a volume of more than 2000 tons
in 2014, an increase of 250 percent from 2004 and 2014. The supply of
smuggled tantalum from conﬂict regions has proven to be remarkably
resilient in the face of legislative action such as the Dodd-Frank act. As
was previously noted by Sprecher et al. (2017) regarding the illegal
trade of rare earth elements, resilience is not necessarily a positive at-
tribute, and has long term implications for the sustainability of the
overall tantalum supply chain.
Our ﬁndings are summarized as follows. Although the ASM supply
from Africa makes the system ﬂexible, the domination of the ASM de-
pendent spot market in tantalum sector is a constraint on system resi-
lience as it negatively inﬂuences prices, and forms an overarching
feedback loop. Declining metal prices cause lower proﬁts for compa-
nies, which leads to lower investments in new primary production and
reduced recycling. As a result of companies complying to certiﬁed
tantalum, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant and increasing levels of recycling of in-
dustrial waste and scrap, as well as limited recycling of EOL products.
Increasing use of recycled material illustrates how recycling contributes
to the overall resilience of the tantalum supply chain, through
switching between alternative sources of supply.
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Price is also a determining factor in material substitution. When
faced with shortages, the industry rapidly substituted alternative ca-
pacitor materials for tantalum, often within one year. This compared to
the 2-year substitution time-lag found by Sprecher et al. (2017) for
neodymium magnets.
Stockpiling of material – either by government or companies – may
also prompt a price increase and the release of an existing stockpile
increases supply and consequently reduces price as was found in this
study. Nationally binding legislations, as e.g. the Dodd-Frank Act in US,
prop-up demand for conﬂict-free material. We found a clear yet tem-
porary price signal at the time of introduction of legislation. Global
enforcement would provide more opportunities for conventional raw
materials producers to (re-)enter the mining and reﬁning market. Such
measures also need to extend to downstream industries including the
exchanges in pre-consumer waste and scrap, as recycling is now
sometimes used as a route to convert illegal tantalum material to cer-
tiﬁed tantalum.
In the larger context, our analysis of the resilience mechanism
shows that, historically, the tantalum supply chain has been very ﬂex-
ible in its response to disruptions and has recovered with remarkable
rapidity. The imbalance in demand and supply and consequent decline
in price is largely attributable to the over dependence of unaccounted
materials from Central Africa traded below market price. However,
price decline is also related to prevailing global market conditions, af-
fecting the entire mineral sector. In this context, it would be very in-
teresting to see future research applying this framework to the supply
chains of major metals like steel, aluminum or copper.
Since this study is based on an inductive reasoning, by its nature, is
more exploratory of each identiﬁed factors we believe this study will
enable other researchers to build on the resilience approach and ana-
lyze more thoroughly the bottlenecks and disruptions in a supply chain
of critical materials. This approach can also be applied to analyze other
conﬂict minerals or precious metals, taking into account the entire
supply chain system.
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